


A SPECIAL REPORT BY SHERLE R. SCHWENNINGER

**THE CASE AGAINST****NATO**

UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN

**ENLARGEMENT:  
CLINTON'S FATEFUL GAMBLE**

The Senate begins hearings this month on the question of NATO expansion, following the decision of the NATO summit this past July to extend membership to three former Soviet-bloc countries: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Having earlier won Moscow's grudging acceptance of NATO enlargement with the signing of the NATO-Russia founding act in May, the Clinton Administration must now gain Senate approval of its plan to extend NATO's

boundaries. The White House touts NATO expansion as the post-cold war equivalent of the Marshall Plan, a strategic decision that would produce a peaceful and whole Europe, help consolidate democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and insure America's continued involvement in European affairs. The opponents of NATO enlargement have been no less dramatic in their characterization of the Administration's initiative. Senior diplomatic historian George Kennan has called NATO enlargement the "most fateful error of American policy in the post-cold war world," one that will inflame anti-Western tendencies in Russian opinion, hinder the development of Russian democracy and move Russian foreign policy in directions we would not like. Other prominent foreign-policy experts have added more concerns, from the fact that expansion would create new dividing lines in Europe to the consequences enlargement would have for the effectiveness of the Western alliance. Indeed, no issue since the Vietnam War has so divided the foreign-policy establishment.

In the end, Senate approval or rejection of NATO enlargement

is expected to turn on three issues: 1) dilution—whether enlargement will reduce NATO's effectiveness as a military defense alliance; 2) costs—how much expansion will cost and who will pay for it; and 3) U.S.-Russian relations—in particular, whether efforts at strategic arms reduction will be jeopardized.

From a quick glance at these issues, one can discern the outlines of a possible albeit politically awkward coalition to stop NATO expansion. It would consist of defense-minded conservatives worried about diluting the coherence and effectiveness of NATO as a military alliance; "isolationist" Republicans concerned about expanding U.S. commitments and angry with a "free-loading" Europe; and liberal Democrats worried about the effects of NATO expansion on U.S.-Russian relations and the prospects for nuclear arms reduction.

Thoughtful progressive opponents of NATO enlargement thus face a dilemma: Defeating NATO expansion requires that they actively join forces with Republican isolationists and defense-minded conservatives. But to do so may give support to political

views and positions that could in the end be as damaging to U.S. foreign policy as NATO expansion itself. As we will see, the questions of dilution and costs—and, to a lesser degree, that of nuclear arms control—are largely spurious issues that could reinforce lingering anti-Russian as well as ever-present unilateralist tendencies in the U.S. body politic. Just as public consideration of the SALT II arms control treaty in the late seventies opened the door for all kinds of specious attacks on the Soviet Union, Senate debate on NATO enlargement may provide a stage for nativist and unreconstructed Russophobes to air their views. Such a debate would push foreign-policy discourse and the NATO initiative itself in the wrong direction. Thus, we could end up with the worst of both worlds: ratification of an ill-advised enlargement and a foreign-policy environment further poisoned against Russia, our European partners and the kind of U.S. engagement with them needed to insure a peaceful world order.



**NATO expansion is a cheap gesture, the perfect policy centerpiece for an Administration sadly lacking in meaningful strategic vision.**

Given these concerns, many progressives may be tempted to soften their opposition to NATO expansion once the Senate debate begins. But that would be a mistake. To allow the isolationists, unilateralists and defense conservatives to dominate the opposition to NATO expansion would be as damaging as actively joining forces with them. The answer is for progressives to speak forcefully and clearly on the issues that really do matter, taking the lead in the debate over NATO expansion and influencing the agenda to move American foreign policy in a constructive direction. The choice of issues on which to take a stand is therefore crucial.

Let us begin with the questions that are expected to dominate the debate—dilution, costs and START II. Dilution is an issue that plays well with isolationist-leaning Republicans and with conservative Democrats, both of whom worry that NATO expansion will compromise the effectiveness of NATO as a military alliance. In their view, not only might enlargement cripple NATO's ability to act coherently and decisively but it will, they fear, devalue the Article 5 guarantees of the NATO founding charter. Under Article 5, NATO members are obliged to consider an armed attack on any of them as the equivalent of "an attack against them all." In an echo of the cold war, critics of NATO enlargement ask, Will the American people really be willing to send American soldiers to defend the eastern border of Poland or Hungary? And if the security guarantees for some are not credible, then under the logic of the alliance they are not credible for any.

For military conservatives, dilution would not be such a worry if enlargement stopped with the first three new members of the alliance. But, in an effort to appease the Baltic states and Romania, the Clinton Administration has taken the position that this is just the first wave of new NATO members; indeed, the July NATO summit called for a second round of invitations to be issued in 1999. NATO thus promises to become an even paler version of itself. At that point, NATO would be, it is feared, just another talking club—an alliance with no teeth.

But dilution is a false issue for a number of reasons. To begin with, in effect it has already happened. NATO as a coherent military defense alliance disappeared when the agreed-upon military threat against which it was organized disappeared. It has stumbled along in the post-cold war period, as might have been expected, unsure of its core mission and often divided when faced with particular conflicts, like that in the former Yugoslavia. Notwithstanding the Clinton Administration's post-Dayton-agreement spin that it was a U.S.-led NATO acting decisively that brought about peace in Bosnia, NATO was in fact badly divided in the first years of the Balkan war and, as a result, was relegated to the sidelines.

It should also be remembered that NATO had no official role in the largest and most successful international military operation of the post-cold war period, Operation Desert Storm against Iraq, an ad hoc multinational alliance approved by the United Nations and led by the United States. If the concern is military effectiveness against international aggression and

the capability for peace enforcement, NATO's internal cohesion may be less important than the relations the United States forms with key powers outside NATO's military command—in particular, with France and with Russia, whose cooperation has been critical both in the war against Iraq and in NATO's stabilization force in Bosnia. NATO enlargement is, therefore, worrying not because it may dilute the alliance but because it may at some point jeopardize Russian cooperation and because it does nothing to address France's concerns about a more equitable sharing of power within NATO between the United States and Europe, the condition Paris has set for rejoining NATO's military command.

Further, it should be noted that with Russia no longer a military threat, the Article 5 guarantees are already devalued because no member—with the possible exception of the Greeks and the Turks, who still have some reason to mistrust each other—needs them. To pretend otherwise is to misallocate diplomatic as well as military and security-related resources. In this sense, NATO enlargement should be seen for what it is, a cheap gesture. Indeed, NATO expansion is the perfect foreign-policy centerpiece for an Administration long on gesture and rhetoric and short on commitment, an Administration given to tactical P.R. and sadly lacking in meaningful strategic vision. NATO enlargement is the ultimate gesture—bringing three former Communist countries that face no immediate or future military threat under America's protective wing with brave words about reversing Yalta.

The second issue of contention in the Senate debate is likely to be over the costs of NATO expansion and who should bear them. At a time of continued spending constraints mandated by the balanced-budget agreement, the Senate can be expected to balk at an expensive new U.S. commitment—even in the favored military area. The Congressional Budget Office, in one of the first studies of the costs of NATO enlargement, has put the price of expansion at \$125 billion over ten years. A subsequent RAND study, following more modest force guidelines, scaled down the cost to \$42 billion. In its own projection of costs the Pentagon has estimated that the expansion would cost \$28-\$35 billion over ten years.

In presenting its case on the cost of NATO expansion, the Clinton Administration faces a dilemma. If it lowballs its figures it will be accused of putting in jeopardy the military effectiveness of NATO and downgrading its Article 5 guarantees—in short, diluting NATO. On the other hand, if it goes with higher estimates, it will run up against the cost-conscious Senate.

The Administration has sought to square the circle by pushing most of the cost onto the Europeans—which is likely to provoke disputes across the Atlantic. According to the latest Pentagon proposal, Washington's share of the costs would be very low, between \$150 million and \$200 million a year. By contrast, the new Central European members would need to come up with \$800 million to \$1 billion annually and the current European allies more than \$1 billion.

Thus Washington would pick up less than 10 percent of the total expansion bill.

While the Administration's cost estimates are likely to play well at the Senate, they will no doubt cause concern with our European allies. It is highly unlikely that the Europeans will come through with their share of the added costs at a time when they are desperately cutting budgets to qualify for European monetary union. Indeed, French President Jacques Chirac has already said as much. As for the new Central European NATO members, they are in no position to increase their military spending. But in their case, the danger is that in their zeal to join NATO they will actually try to do so at the expense of economic modernization needs. The plans being tossed around for the purchase of new fighter aircraft alone would come to as much as \$10 billion, according to some industry representatives. The I.M.F. and World Bank have both warned the Central Europeans not to overspend on Western arms as part of their drive to join NATO. Yet the Clinton Administration's plan for NATO expansion directly contradicts that wise advice.

If the Administration persists in its strategy of pushing the costs onto NATO's European members, it will aggravate a festering wound of anti-European feelings in the Senate over Europe's "paltry" military contributions—feelings the Administration has itself helped to create with exaggerated tales of U.S. achievements and European failures in Bosnia. In turn, the Europeans will see the complaints emanating from the Senate as yet another example of U.S. hypocrisy—of using other people's money to gain greater American glory and influence.



**We could end up with the worst of both worlds: ill-advised NATO enlargement and an environment further poisoned against Russia.**

In the storm of charges and countercharges over burden sharing, much more important issues will be lost. First, what in fact is all this additional NATO military spending for? Is the new spending related to defending new members from a military threat? If so, what military threat? Or is it solely for integrating them into NATO's military command? If so, what missions does NATO envision that require their active participation? If those missions involve principally peacekeeping and peace enforcement functions, why does NATO need such extensive forces in Central Europe? Indeed, at a time when there is no threat on the horizon, why aren't existing forces being more radically scaled down? Discussion of cost without consideration of these issues will only reinforce the view that NATO still sees Russia as its

principal military threat, with all the consequences this would have for NATO-Russian relations.

Second, if burden sharing is such a high priority, why hasn't the Administration moved more quickly to redefine Europe's role in NATO? For years, Washington has urged the Europeans to share more of the security burden in Europe and elsewhere, but at the same time has repeatedly blocked any European initiatives too independent of NATO's current military command structure, which it controls. Admittedly, Europe has been halfhearted in many of its efforts, but in the past year or two it has developed, with U.S. support, a new concept, known as combined and joint task forces, that envisages Europeans acting militarily without U.S. participation. It was partly the prospect of a stronger and

more independent Europe—a European NATO within NATO—that led France to agree to rejoin NATO's military command in 1995. But now the United States has

thrown up several new obstacles to this idea, refusing to turn over any part of NATO's southern command to a European and demanding that Europe restrict its own arrangements to emergencies and not seek a peacetime European planning and command setup inside NATO. In short, burden sharing is a two-sided problem. Without Washington owning up to its responsibility for America's lopsided security burden in Europe, any debate on the costs of NATO enlargement is likely to degenerate into an exercise of bashing the Europeans—to the detriment of real NATO reform and U.S.-European relations.

The third and potentially most contentious issue in the Senate debate will be the effects of NATO enlargement on the future of U.S.-Russian relations—in particular, on the prospects for nuclear arms reductions. U.S.-Russian relations should indeed be central to any debate on NATO expansion. But several factors may work against a useful discussion.

To begin with, there is the danger that the debate will be dominated by Russophobes who believe that the Clinton Administration has conceded too much to Russia with the conclusion of the NATO-Russia founding act. Henry Kissinger, for example, has put forward the totally unfounded argument that the act gives Russia not just a voice in NATO affairs but a potential veto through the NATO-Russia council it establishes. The council, Kissinger argues, threatens to supersede the alliance's own policy-making sessions, thus allowing Moscow to hold the alliance hostage on all major issues. His interpretation is erroneous, but it may force the Administration to disparage the founding act in a way that reveals just how little in fact was given to Russia, exposing the Yeltsin government to internal criticism and providing support for extremist voices in Russia.

While the NATO-Russia founding act has opened the door for anti-Russian arguments, it has worked to silence liberal critics, who now find it more difficult to argue that NATO enlargement will isolate Moscow or provoke nationalist reaction within Russia. Indeed, the Administration has effectively neutralized for now those critics concerned about U.S.-Russian relations by pointing not just to the founding act but also to the Yeltsin government's continued commitment to U.S.-Russian cooperation and to pub-

lic opinion polls that show little interest in the NATO issue among ordinary Russians. While the reality of the Russian reaction is more complex than this would suggest, it is true that none of the more worrisome developments—inflaming Russian nationalist passions or hindering Russian democracy—that the early critics warned of have yet to come to pass, seemingly undermining their case (more about this later).

Consequently, centrist and liberal critics have begun to focus on the fate of the START II treaty, which was signed in 1993 and ratified by the Senate last year. The Duma, Russia's Parliament, has yet to take it up. At first glance, a decision to focus on the START II treaty would seem to be a wise strategy, for the treaty requires the two parties to cut their arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons from 7,500 to 3,500 each and to eliminate huge land-based missiles that carry up to ten warheads each. But even given this, START II is an issue of second-order importance that does not warrant being made, once again, the primary question of U.S.-Russian relations. In focusing on START II, not



**The Clinton Administration seems motivated more by a 'Yalta complex' of guilt than by a desire to bring about East-West reconciliation.**

only are liberal critics resurrecting the old theology of arms control—that numbers of warheads beyond a few hundred matter—but in effect they are saying that an adversarial relationship with Russia still exists and, as a result, it matters to American and European security whether Moscow has 3,500 or 7,500 warheads. Whether Russia's nuclear weapons pose a problem for international security depends far less on their numbers than on the kinds of safeguards Moscow implements for them. Even more important, it depends on the kind of relationship Russia has with the United States and with its European and Asian neighbors.

START II is important to U.S.-Russian relations and to world security, but only to the extent that it would allow the United States and Russia to move with more credibility to the next stage of multilateral nuclear disarmament and work together to stop nuclear proliferation, including the export of Russian-made nuclear material and technology. In the context of NATO expansion, however, to focus on START II would reinforce the impression many Russians have that what Washington cares about first and foremost is disarming Russia and is less concerned about Russian integration into the world community: its participation in NATO, the Group of Eight and the World Trade Organization, all issues of greater urgency to Russia.

If the questions of dilution, costs and START II are not the most promising issues of a progressive strategy to stop NATO expansion, then what are? Progressive critics should ask three questions about NATO expansion.

First, does it promote—or hinder—a historic reconciliation of former enemies in Europe and thus establish the basis for an enduring political settlement of the cold war? To constitute an enduring settlement, reconciliation must take place on several levels: between Russia and the Western powers of the NATO alliance; between Russia and its former Warsaw Pact subjects; and between Russia and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, particularly the Baltic republics and Ukraine. It must also involve reconciliation between other traditional antagonists, like Hungary and Romania, and Poland and Germany.

The goal ought to be the same kind of reconciliation that the United States helped to engineer in the postwar period between France and Germany with the Marshall Plan, followed by the establishment of the European Community and the NATO alliance. Such a strategic reconciliation would entail these elements: first, helping the countries concerned overcome the historical fears and resentments that almost fifty years of cold war (and centuries of earlier geopolitical rivalry) have created; second, encouraging a dynamic of political and economic cooperation that enables countries of the region to see their shared destinies; and third, building pan-European institutions that bind them all together and create effective constraints on their behavior.

NATO enlargement makes these goals more difficult. It does so from the outset by giving in to the fears and resentments that the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians understandably harbor against their big neighbor to the east. In its decision to push NATO expansion, the Clinton Administration seems more motivated by a misplaced sense of guilt when it

comes to the Central European countries—a “Yalta” complex—than it does by a genuine desire to bring about the reconciliation of East and West in Europe. Reconciliation means addressing both parties' fears without pandering to either. If Washington wants to convince the Russians that they are acting out of a mistaken historical distrust of NATO when they express alarm about NATO expansion, then it must not encourage the equally unjustified fears of the Poles and other Central Europeans about post-cold war Russia. If reconciliation is to occur, Russia must be judged not by what it has done in the past but by what it is trying to (and could with Western help) become: a modern, market-oriented democracy.

Thus the United States is sending the wrong message to both Russia and its former Warsaw Pact allies. Instead of pandering to their anxieties, the United States should be saying to the Poles and Czechs that out of their own interest they must help consolidate democracy in Russia and bring Russia more fully into the West, just as France did with Germany a generation ago. Yet by pushing NATO enlargement Washington is suggesting to the Central Europeans that they can avoid this difficult but necessary historical process by seeking shelter under a military umbrella they do not need. NATO expansion may arguably have some short-term benefits—for example, it could encourage the Hungarians and Romanians to improve relations—but it does not offer a framework for a sustainable reconciliation between the many former antagonists in Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO expansion, in fact, works against reconciliation by creating some potentially worrisome divisions in Europe. The Administration, of course, argues that with enlargement it wishes to erase the old dividing lines established by Yalta. In fact, it is only moving the dividing line eastward. What's more, it is doing so in a way that threatens to create other troubling divisions—divisions between rich and poor, between more advanced and less advanced transition economies, between those that are included in NATO and those left out. For example, as a result of NATO expansion, the countries excluded will be put at an even greater disadvantage in attracting sizable Western investment, further

slowing their economic progress and increasing the gap that already exists between the better-off prospective Central European members of NATO and their neighbors to the east. This disparity will grow even wider if the expansion of the European Union follows roughly the same lines as NATO enlargement, which now seems likely.

A new division between Central and Eastern Europe would serve no one's interests—not even those of the fortunate chosen candidates, for they can feel secure only to the extent that the entire region prospers and modernizes. To the extent that NATO expansion weakens the economic prospects of their eastern neighbors, they too will suffer—not only from the threat of political instability but also economically. In the first years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Central European countries dramatically reoriented their trade to the West—in particular, to the European Union—and cut economic ties to the east, in part out of an ideological desire to be part of the West and in part because of the deep depression in Russia and the former Soviet republics. Yet the Central European economies need expanding markets to the east if they are to realize their full economic potential. The European Union is growing too slowly and maintains too many barriers against Central and Eastern European goods. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, many Central European products would not be competitive in E.U. markets even if they didn't face protective barriers. Not surprisingly, the transition economies are suffering from large and growing trade deficits with the European Union that need to be balanced in part by surpluses in their trade with the east. They have gone from overdependence on the east to overdependence on the E.U. They must now diversify their trade and investment ties if they are to avoid trade-related constraints to modernization. The new divisions and tensions that NATO expansion will create, however, threaten that goal. In fact, what the Central Europeans need is not the expansion of a U.S.-dominated NATO but a real post-cold war Marshall Plan: an effort to revive the economies to the east and create common trade and investment initiatives.

Finally, NATO expansion hinders strategic reconciliation by excluding Russia from full participation in a future European community. Reconciliation of France and Germany did not occur by keeping West Germany out of Europe but by anchoring it alongside France in the same institutions. In so doing, the architects of the postwar peace gave both countries a stake in a common future. NATO expansion denies Russia, Germany, Poland and the other Eastern European countries that sense of a common future. Russian exclusion from NATO and the E.U. would not be so serious if in the process the United States had not with NATO expansion downgraded the pan-European institutions that do exist, namely, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (O.S.C.E.) and NATO's own Partnership for Peace, of which Russia is a part. Indeed, a number of experts believe it would have been better to strengthen the successful P.F.P. initiative than to pursue NATO enlargement, for P.F.P. offered Central and Eastern European countries most of the advantages of NATO membership without the divisive effects that NATO expansion portends.

To be sure, the NATO-Russia council established by the NATO-Russia founding act does give Russia some say in Euro-

pean security matters. Yet it also confirms that Russia is not part of Europe or the transatlantic community but rather a Eurasian power. As such, it threatens to reintroduce great-power politics back into post-cold war European relations.

Future geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West can be avoided under two scenarios: Either Russia is fully integrated into the West, or Moscow and the NATO powers arrive at a security system on the Eurasian continent by common consent. (Arguably, there is a third scenario: that of a Russia too weak to compete effectively, which seems the preferred strategy of some NATO-expansion advocates.) NATO expansion excludes the first and, as for the second, NATO enlargement also excludes it in that the NATO-Russia founding act is the product more of Russian weakness than of Russian consent. If Moscow had been given a real voice in the future security architecture of Europe, it would never have permitted NATO expansion. The NATO-Russia founding act may help the Yeltsin government save face—to mask Russian weakness—but it does not alter the fact that NATO expansion is the product of a stronger NATO imposing its position on a weaker Russia. This is not a solid foundation for an enduring peace. The larger lesson that Moscow could reasonably draw from this experience is for it to organize its own sphere of influence to balance NATO—so that in the future any agreement is an agreement between “equals”: a Washington-led alliance and a Moscow-led Commonwealth of Independent States alliance.

Thus, rather than establishing the foundation for a mutually agreed-upon security order, NATO expansion opens the door for future geopolitical rivalry by in effect legitimizing Moscow's efforts to create its own alliance. One can, of course, hope that despite NATO expansion future Russian leaders will be smart enough to focus on economic modernization, but as NATO approaches Russian borders, one cannot rule out the return of old-fashioned alliance building. Even the Yeltsin government, which represents the political faction in Russia most inclined toward economic modernization and cooperation with the West, has seemingly accepted this logic, for it has in the wake of the signing of the founding act stepped up efforts to strengthen its ties with the former Soviet republics as well as to expand relations with China and Iran in an effort to balance NATO.

This leads to the second set of questions that should be asked: Does NATO expansion increase NATO's and hence America's capacity for dealing with the real security challenges of the twenty-

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first century? As suggested earlier, Russian cooperation will be critical in dealing with many of the conflicts that may affect European security over the next decade or two. By and large these conflicts will, like the recent Balkan wars, fall outside NATO's formal territory and will involve continuing transition-related struggles over the composition and control of newly independent states that resulted from the breakup of the Soviet Union. They will also involve possible spillover from collapsing states, like Albania and Belarus, and from internal conflicts in northern Africa and the Middle East as well as from conflicts related to the unsettled disputes between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean.

NATO expansion does little or nothing to insure the cooperation or constraint from Russia that will be necessary to solve these conflicts. Indeed, it provides the opposite incentive: for Russia to compete in those areas not formally part of NATO and to exclude NATO from any involvement in areas of vital Russian interest. Russian nationalists could reasonably ask: Since the NATO-Russia agreement gives Moscow little or no say over who joins NATO and what NATO does in its own area of interest, why should Moscow allow the United States to have a say in areas bordering Russia and in its sphere of influence? If Russia is more protective of its interests in the Caspian Sea region in the future, for example, we should not be surprised. Some influential figures in Russian foreign-policy circles are already talking about creating a NATO-free zone, from the Caucasus to Central Asia to western China.

What is worse, NATO expansion threatens to create tensions and conflicts in the heart of Central and Eastern Europe that would otherwise not exist. For example, expansion puts back into geopolitical play most of the nations that are to be excluded from the first round of enlargement, making them again potential objects of renewed East-West rivalry. The Clinton Administration justifies NATO enlargement in part as an effort to avoid a new security vacuum in Central Europe, but even as it removes some countries from East-West competition it only increases the potential intensity of the rivalry over others, like the Baltic states and Ukraine. As NATO expands to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the exclusion of the Baltic states from NATO membership and Ukraine from a NATO sphere of influence will become even more important goals of Russian foreign policy.



**Some in Russian policy circles are now talking about creating a NATO-free zone, from the Caucasus to Central Asia to western China.**

Fearing that they will be relegated to a new buffer zone between East and West or, worse, sacrificed to a new Russian sphere of influence in the jockeying over NATO expansion, the Baltic states will become even more desperate to get into NATO, and Russia even more determined to keep them out. Likewise, Ukraine will become increasingly intent on strengthening its ties with NATO and Moscow ever more sensitive to NATO efforts to expand its influence eastward, especially through military-related cooperation with Ukraine. Such is the absurd and counterproductive political dynamic NATO enlargement could encourage.

Clinton Administration officials and supporters of NATO expansion dispute these worries, pointing to the NATO-Russia founding act and the Yeltsin government's more forthcoming approach to Ukraine. But Administration officials and other ex-

pansion advocates are premature to celebrate the agreement as a vindication of their view that NATO enlargement poses little risk of provoking a nationalist backlash in Russia or of making Russia less cooperative. Not only are they overlooking the steps referred to earlier that Russia has already taken to counter NATO expansion, but the true test of the effects of NATO expansion on Russian foreign policy will not come for another year or two, as we approach the next elections in Russia and as the actual process of NATO enlargement moves forward, closer to the naming of the next group of NATO members. A number of likely presidential candidates, including Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, are already positioning themselves to push an anti-NATO position and to toughen their stance on Ukraine. As a source of endless challenge to Moscow's perceived interests and as a constant reminder that Russia is not part of the Western club, NATO enlargement poses an ongoing risk of nationalist reaction.

If NATO makes future Russian cooperation more uncertain, it also diverts attention and resources from other security-related challenges, from ethnic conflicts in the Balkans to consolidating democracy and market economies in other countries. An alliance focused on modernizing the militaries of Central Europe and fending off Russian complaints about NATO expansion cannot sufficiently tend to these other problems.

The Administration would probably concede that the overwhelming security challenge in Europe is the need to help consolidate democracy and market economies in the transition societies and to stave off social collapse in those places, like Albania and Ukraine, where reforms have yet to be implemented. The Administration has also argued that NATO expansion serves that purpose: that the mere prospect of NATO membership has encouraged potential new members to redouble their efforts at economic reform and democratization. There is some evidence for the Administration's claims, particularly in the case of Romania. But there are also reasons for skepticism. First, the main incentive Central and Eastern European countries have for instituting tough economic reforms is future membership in the European Union, not NATO. The European common market, including access to the E.U.'s regional development funds, is what Central Europeans need. To the extent that the NATO enlargement process allows the European Union to delay its own enlargement efforts, it could actually operate against democratization and economic reforms. Second, if prospective NATO membership is a factor in encouraging reform, and in the case of Hungary and Romania also reconciliation, then it can also lead to disillusionment and a sense of betrayal when membership is not forthcoming. Such is the danger now in Romania, especially since its traditional rival, Hungary, has been included in the first tier of new NATO members.


Then, too, the focus on NATO, with its emphasis on military modernization, may divert attention and resources away from other more important dimensions of economic modernization. NATO expansion, as we have seen, will not be cheap. Consequently, aspiring NATO members may be forced to shortchange new social and industrial investment. Western assistance pro-

grams may also be affected, since resources going into military modernization will not be available to countries that still need Western help. The mere mention of coordinated economic assistance—a true Marshall Plan—prompts pained looks on the faces of Clinton Administration officials wary of any new foreign assistance commitments. Yet they have no reservations about putting forward a strategy for NATO enlargement that will cost \$30-\$35 billion over the next ten years, knowing that such a strategy only further reduces the chances for real assistance for the Eastern European countries still struggling with painful structural adjustments. In this and other respects, the prospect of NATO membership is not helpful to the countries that most need Western help, such as Albania, Ukraine and Bulgaria. If democracy and market reforms are one of the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Central and Eastern Europe, there are more direct and effective ways to encourage these goals.

The third and final question progressives should pose of NATO expansion is the following: Does it advance or undercut other important U.S. foreign-policy goals? The Administration argues that NATO expansion will insure America's continued involvement in Europe. But it does so in a way that threatens to undermine other important American foreign-policy objectives with regard to Europe. The end of the cold war afforded the United States an opportunity to reduce its costly military burden in Europe, to rebalance its military responsibilities with greater engagement on trade and investment questions, and to insure a faster-growing and more open European Union. The need to help consolidate democracy and market economies in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe provided Washington with the vehicle to pursue these objectives.

By pushing NATO reform—by giving Europeans more say in NATO and refocusing NATO's mission in the post-cold war world—the United States could reduce its military burden in Europe. By redeploying some of those resources toward transition assistance and investment guarantees for the Central and Eastern European economies, the United States could not only shift its focus from military to economic goals but also gain a foothold in the emerging economies along the eastern rim of the European Union. Moreover, by establishing with the European Union a common overriding goal of helping the Central and Eastern Europeans—above all by opening up European markets and expanding Western investment—the United States could influence the direction of the E.U. away from the more closed, federal structure envisioned by the 1991 Maastricht agreement to a more open, growth-oriented union.

But the Clinton Administration has squandered this opportunity, first by not putting its weight behind the 1993 Vance-Owen plan (the E.U.- and U.N.-sponsored proposal that would have preserved a multi-ethnic Bosnia) and now by pushing NATO expansion. By putting expansion above NATO reform, it has delayed the day when the Europeans themselves would assume more of the burden for their own security. And by pushing aside the E.U. as the principal organization responsible for democratization and economic modernization in Central and Eastern Europe, the United States has given up what little leverage it had to nudge Europe to adopt policies that would have produced a more open and faster-growing European Union.



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Ironically, NATO expansion gives the United States little or no leverage over the Europeans, for the simple reason that they are ambivalent about the entire effort; they welcome it to the extent that it relieves them of any urgent obligation to offer early E.U. membership to the new Central European democracies but are unwilling to make it a priority that would require them to commit their own resources. Tellingly, the United States has had to use up precious political capital with the Europeans to get them fully on board. It has had to use up even more capital to enlist their help in the difficult task of reassuring the Russians. And, finally, it has tied Washington's hands in trying to get the Europeans to assume the future burden in Bosnia, for now the Europeans know that for the United States to pull out of Bosnia on the eve of NATO expansion would doom the Administration's pet project. As a result, they can now insist on a continuing U.S. presence in Bosnia as the price for their own participation in NATO's forces there.

NATO expansion also promises to complicate America's relations with Russia beyond the European-related security issues already mentioned. The United States shares with Russia a number of common interests and important international objectives, from managing China's regional ambitions to the control of nuclear weapons proliferation to the peaceful development of Caspian Sea oil. NATO expansion has turned Russia from a potential active partner with the United States in dealing with China and "rogue" states like Iran and Iraq to a potential leader of a coalition opposing U.S. hegemony that includes both Iran and China. As a result of NATO expansion, Moscow now has little or no incentive to heed Western concerns in the development of its relations with Iran or Iraq or with China or India. Indeed, expanding its ties with these countries may be the key to balancing NATO's power in the future, so that it never again has to negotiate from a position of weakness. Balancing U.S. power may become a more important goal for Moscow than the interests it shares with Washington, like constraining the growth of China's and Iran's military capabilities. In this instance, George Kennan is correct when he observes that NATO enlargement will "impel Russian foreign policy in directions not to our liking."



**If democracy and market reforms are primary objectives, then NATO expansion is a major misallocation of U.S. diplomatic resources.**

Moreover, because of its strategic position—vis-à-vis China, Korea, Japan, India, Iran and the European Union—Russia holds the key not only to a future anti-U.S. coalition but also to a multipolar world. But while a multipolar world is inevitable, a multipolar world with an estranged Russia and China as its midwives is less likely to be in America's interest than one that the United States itself helps to bring about with Russia and the European Union as its principal partners.

In this and other respects, NATO expansion represents a major misallocation of U.S. diplomatic resources—and other people's money, if indeed Washington is successful in pushing the costs onto the Europeans. Indeed, the greatest tragedy of this whole Administration effort is the misuse of scarce diplomatic resources for NATO-expansion damage control at the expense of other critical foreign-policy needs—whether they be the peace process in the Middle East or the consolidation of market economies in Eastern Europe. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is cor-

rect to point out that the United States suffers from a serious diplomatic deficit. But by pushing NATO expansion, she herself is one of the primary contributors to this deficit.

These, then, are the principal questions progressives should seek to raise in the forthcoming Senate ratification debate. Admittedly, these concerns are not likely to play well with other opponents of NATO expansion in the Senate—Republican isolationists and defense-minded conservatives. But stopping NATO expansion is only one goal. If NATO enlargement cannot be stopped, then the goal should be to push the debate in a direction that will encourage the Administration to minimize the damage that NATO expansion threatens to do to America's larger foreign-policy interests.

In this respect, progressives should put forward three policy initiatives in the NATO-expansion debate. These initiatives would constitute an alternative to expansion if it is defeated, and would complement and offset some of the damaging consequences of expansion if it is not.

First, we should propose the establishment of a new Partnership for Peace initiative that would be jointly sponsored by Russia and NATO and coordinated by the NATO-Russia council. The Partnership for Peace II would be the designated vehicle for preparing both NATO members and non-

NATO countries for joint peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the European and Eurasian theaters. This would be an initial step toward an integrated European security system that would include Russia as a full-fledged member. It would also be a way of giving substance to the NATO-Russia council and hence a way of giving Russia a real voice in European security matters.

Second, progressives should put forward a timetable for NATO reform that would supersede the timetable for NATO expansion. NATO reform consists of two elements: first, giving the Europeans more say and thus more responsibility for European security; and second, redefining NATO's principal security missions, including its relationship with the proposed new Partnership for Peace initiative, the O.S.C.E., the U.N. and the West European Union, the prospective military arm of the European Union. The second element is of particular importance to the goal of constructing a security system in Europe by common consent. Washington should be asked to put a hold on its plans for integrating new NATO members into NATO's military command until it has clearly laid out NATO's military missions and begun discussions with Moscow on the creation of the new Partnership for Peace effort. In this way, the United States could further reassure Russia that NATO expansion is not against Russian interests.

Finally, we need to address the concerns of those countries that will be left out of the first round of NATO expansion and E.U. enlargement and at the same time refocus their attention to needed economic transition measures. To date Washington has offered these countries little if anything even as it has made their future political and economic prospects more uncertain. Progressives should therefore put forward a Partnership for Prosperity initiative to complement the new Partnership for Peace initiative. Like the Partnership for Peace initiative, Partnership for Prosperity would

include both NATO and non-NATO members but would be particularly aimed at those countries who most need help with their unfinished transitions to democracy and market economies.

This new mini-Marshall Plan initiative would involve a new package of investment guarantees, trade concessions and social safety support for these countries. Money now designated to pay for NATO expansion could be earmarked for Partnership for Prosperity. Such an initiative would help ease some of the many tensions NATO enlargement will create. Moreover, it would focus the attention of non-NATO countries on political and economic advancement rather than on the awkward position NATO enlargement has created for them. While the benefits of such an initiative would be aimed principally at those countries, like Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania, that have been left out of the first round of NATO expansion, it would be inclusive in that all countries in Europe, including Russia, would participate. Creating a dynamic of trade and investment among these struggling reformers and engaging the European Union and Russia in a com-

mon effort would do far more for European security than would current plans to integrate Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO's military command.

NATO expansion presents the Senate with some fundamental policy choices—about U.S.-Russian relations, about the nature of U.S. engagement in Europe and about how we are to allocate our scarce diplomatic and foreign-policy resources in the years ahead. In selling its NATO-expansion initiative, the Administration has attempted to blur these choices—in part out of a need to obscure the many inherently contradictory goals it is pursuing with NATO enlargement. The role of progressives should be to help clarify those choices for the Senate and the American public—by raising the kinds of questions outlined earlier, by putting forward alternative policy initiatives like those just mentioned and by taking an active and forceful role in the Senate debate. In so doing, we would perform a public service far greater than meekly falling in line with the Administration's confused and misguided NATO-expansion policy. ■

## LETTERS

C O N T I N U E D

(Continued From Page 2)

States, of course, but also the State of Ohio and those who are injured financially: those who will lose their jobs or lose B.P. as a customer—utilities, the community that is losing tax revenues and perhaps others.

THOMAS M. KERR

Tustin, Calif.

■ I find it amazing that the mayor of Lima, Ohio, as well as the local union have not considered another possible motive for British Petroleum's refusal to sell the plant—the degree of possible contamination on the site. According to an article by Ed Hopkins, environmental policy director for Ohio Citizen Action, a study of Ohio's largest oil and chemical companies found that B.P.'s plants spilled more pollutants and had a larger number of spills than any other Ohio oil or chemical plant.

The State of Ohio and state regulatory agencies have been cited by the Sierra Club for skewing the regulatory process in favor of industry. Those in public office who have long feared the consequences of calling B.P. to task, including the Ohio E.P.A., appear to have sacrificed too much in an effort to keep jobs in their state and community.

JEANNE HASSAN

### CAN YOU HUM A FEW BARS?

Wooster, Ohio

■ Ira Katznelson's idea of "autonomy" is sound, but the word hardly stirs the adrenalin ["The Fight for Liberalism," July 14]. Years ago political scientist William Riker examined the basic democratic documents, looking for a common theme. What he came up with was "self-respect for everyone." These words capture Katznelson's ideas and set them to music. I nominate them as the grand idea around which liberals can rebuild.

GORDON L. SHULL

Stroudsburg, Pa.

■ Ira Katznelson's attempt to create a relevant

and appealing liberalism suited to our age is marred by his ignoring the environmental determinants of the future. The next century will be dominated by a burgeoning population and declining natural resources. We must downsize our consumption while increasing our contribution to Third World sustainable development.

Who will make the decisions and who will make the sacrifices? Within what framework of ideas and institutions will people be willing to share with the poor nations? What kind of public philosophy will enable people to think and act with a far-sighted consciousness rather than the current myopia? Can we visualize a liberal public philosophy that deals with the challenges of a declining environment?

PETER COHEN

Olympia, Wash.

■ Ira Katznelson's call for the revival of liberalism is a regressive suggestion. The last thing the left needs is to split over returning to the liberalism that failed us. When our economy was doing well, government could afford to offer us concessions to keep us happy and quiet—civil rights advances, a basic welfare system, Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare. It was only after the economic boom that followed World War II that these benefits began to filter through major parts of our society. The middle class surged, people had benefits and security in their jobs and the government took a central role in the welfare of the people.

Now, the whole capitalist world has fallen into challenging times. The concessions our government granted us are being eliminated. People on the margins are being cut away from government responsibility. First it is immigrants who don't deserve basic assistance. Then it is women who choose, or are forced, to stand outside patriarchal structures. Then it will be another group, and another, and eventually it will be you whose rights are stripped away. The government's responsibility to business, however, is not

being questioned. We go before business goes.

Liberalism did not "[bring] an organized working class into political life" but encouraged our retirement by making us believe we had won workers' rights, benefits, protection and, most of all, the government's commitment to us. We leftists abandoned liberalism because we were had. There was no lasting, meaningful change.

We do need to redefine and re-create a public philosophy. But we do not want or need liberalism back. We need to come up with a goal (a state that belongs and is responsible to us, *not* to business interests), a strategy and an ideology that puts the state permanently in our hands. Katznelson's article contained a variety of excellent suggestions for action. We need to unite behind them and behind the values of democracy, egalitarianism and tolerance.

JANET HINKEL

### THE ART OF THE NAME

New York City

■ Arthur Danto's thoughtful review of *The Mechanism of Meaning* by Arakawa-Gins was marred by the reference to the collaborative team of Arakawa and Madeline Gins as "the Arakawas" ["Art," Aug. 11/18]. To my knowledge Gins's name has always been Madeline Gins. Moreover, both Arakawa and Gins have produced significant bodies of work individually. The joint signature—Arakawa-Gins—suggests a creative synergy that is more than the sum of its parts while at the same time retaining the specificity of each. To abbreviate this under one name is a misrepresentation of the nature of their collaboration.

SAMIRA KAWASH

### CORRECTION

■ In Eric Alterman's "The C.I.A.'s Fifty Candles" [Oct. 6], the man who informed a Congressman about a C.I.A. asset's involvement in murder in Guatemala was a State Department, not C.I.A., official.

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