

RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PEOPLE.

It has been noted that the language held by the Hon. William Sulzer is amazingly like that of the Hon. Theodore Roosevelt. Both are tremendously strong on giving "the people" exactly what they want when they want it, and on compelling all office-holders to be rigidly accountable at all times to the voters. Indeed, in this doctrine, Mr. Sulzer long anticipated Mr. Roosevelt. He has proclaimed it in season and out of season, with thought and without it—mostly the latter—these many years. The sonorous old phrases naturally, therefore, come more trippingly from his tongue than they do from Mr. Roosevelt's. All power direct from the people, all responsibility immediately and continuously to the people—that has been the "bountiful answer" that fits all political questions, which Mr. Sulzer set forth in a hundred speeches long before the Colonel took it up. In this respect, Roosevelt and Sulzer to-day illustrate the fellowship of kindred minds.

Responsibility to the people has often, as we all know, been made to cover a multitude of political sins. It is a glib and mouth-filling phrase, the real meaning of which, in any given case, depends upon the spirit and purpose of the public man who uses it. We know what Gov. Hughes meant by it. He announced that he held his commission from the people of New York, and that he intended to be their responsible Executive, but the result was to fill the State with cries of rage by offended politicians. Hughes, they said, was a compound of the revolutionist and the renegade. Much the same was said of Woodrow Wilson when he followed the same line as Governor of New Jersey. On the other hand, bosses and political corruptionists have always loudly professed the desire to know what was the popular will in order that they might carry it out. They, too, have said that all their influence came from the people, and that it was their constant effort to satisfy them, knowing that the people held the power of life and death over them. In this, so far as lip-professions go, Boss Barnes would be at one with Charles E. Hughes, "Jim" Smith with Gov. Wilson. It is obvious that a phrase like "responsibility to the people," which is thus capable of covering, as by a single blanket, Richard Croker and Theodore Roosevelt, requires analysis and explanation. The thing

cannot be so simple as it looks. There must be some catch in it, some misunderstanding.

The whole question was examined by Mr. Arthur Sedgwick in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard, which have now been issued by the Scribners under the title "The Democratic Mistake." Mr. Sedgwick does not in the least reject the idea of the necessity of political responsibility to the people, under our form of government. Rather he exalts it. But he shows by an inquiry into the history of the conception, and its actual working out in practice, what abuses have crept in under guise of it, and what changes are needful if the fundamental idea is to be made of real value. In the beginning, the thought was to find some authority other than the Crown or the Ministry to whom public officials should be "answerable," by whom they might be censured if unfaithful, and deprived of their positions. It was natural, and it was wise, in our young democracy, to substitute "the people" for the old reviewing and controlling power of King or Cabinet. But from this it did not at all follow that the only way to enforce responsibility to the people was by frequent elections, by a large multiplication of elective offices, and by the creation of complicated political machinery. "When annual elections cease, tyranny begins." There may be some force in that venerable saying, but it all depends upon the political conditions prevailing. If there is in existence a greedy boss or an all-powerful machine, dictating all nominations and demanding all patronage, the election of a lot of officials every year would merely mean glorious new opportunities to build up the only tyrannous power within the state which we have any reason to dread, and really would make it harder than ever for the people to make their will known and effective.

This is the theme which Mr. Sedgwick suggestively develops. He is certainly in line with the best opinion, and also with the best practice, of our time, when he insists that actual responsibility to the people has been too much obscured and dissipated, and that the way to restore it is by electing fewer men to office, while appointing more, fixing accountability in officials to whom we give more power and a longer tenure, and everywhere simplifying political

machinery as much as possible. Commission government, the concentration of authority in executives, the short ballot, biennial or triennial Legislatures, continuity in office of useful public servants during good behavior—all these things, so much cried out against by politicians of the baser sort, are truly devices to make responsibility to the people more real. Contrast all this with Mr. Sulzer's notion of making spoils of all the offices as speedily as possible. He would have "rotation in office," as a means of making the people a force in the government, but what he would actually bring about in that way would be a demoralization and degradation of the public service, while leaving the people in such a whirl of being "rotated" that they would not know whom to commend or whom to punish.

"REAL" POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

The decision of the California Supreme Court in the Taft-Roosevelt electoral contest is an illuminating comment upon the glib charge that our courts have usurped legislative functions, and, besides, are so fossilized that they cannot properly interpret acts which are in accord with modern ideas of justice. To the mind of every judge of the California court, the primary law which he was interpreting was anything but a guarantee of political justice. Its practical effect is the disfranchisement of scores of thousands of voters. Yet the court meekly bowed its head to the sovereign will of the people, constitutionally expressed, and set the seal of legality upon the morally indefensible course of the Johnson Republican organization. The recall of decisions could have done no more. Such incidents as this make one wonder whether, after all, the indictment of our representative institutions is so complete as to call for their condemnation. To ask a still bolder question, Is direct legislation synonymous with popular government?

An answer, one would think, must be found in the pages of the September *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, which is concerned with the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. As one proceeds through the volume, it becomes evident that the work of getting the people to rule themselves has not been without its difficulties. Certain kinds of measures, indeed, are regarded as unsuited for popular

consideration at all, not because of any preconceived theory of the limits of a pure democracy, but because experience, even a short experience, has shown the folly of submitting them to popular vote. Among these are any measures that fail to interest the people, also complicated questions, and competing or alternative proposals. This last class has caused advocates of direct legislation much trouble. The unruly voter, apparently determined to justify at all hazards the confidence reposed in him, is not unlikely to vote for both of the alternatives instead of one of them. This is such an embarrassment of riches for even the greatest admirers of genuinely popular government that various States have been compelled to provide against it by some such device as that proposed for Wisconsin, by which, in the solemn language of the pending amendment to the State Constitution, "if measures which conflict with each other in any of their essential provisions are submitted at the same election, only the measure receiving the highest number of votes shall stand as the enactment of the people." This is almost as arbitrary an interpretation of the popular will as we are accustomed to have from the courts.

More striking than this deliberate withdrawal of whole categories of measures from the domain of direct legislation is the attitude of its supporters towards the majority of the voters. In the very act of pleading the right of "the people" to originate, consider, accept, and reject legislative proposals, they confess a profound skepticism regarding the activity of the bulk of the electorate in reference to such proposals. In the first place, the percentage of signatures necessary to invoke the authority of the initiative and referendum is usually small. The favorite figure for the initiative in ordinary legislation is 8 per cent., for the referendum 5 per cent., although Ohio has settled on 3 per cent. This arrangement is modified here and there by a provision similar to that proposed for Wisconsin, according to which not more than half of the signatures shall be from a single county.

But the significant thing in this respect is the position of advocates of direct legislation with reference to the number of votes that shall be necessary to carry a measure. Almost, if not quite, invariably, this number is not a major-

ity of those voting at the election in which such measures are presented, but only a majority of those voting on the measures. That this often means government by a minority is demonstrated by the records of such elections, which have doubtless influenced the adoption of this very provision. It is not so common to find an advocate of direct legislation standing up for this condition. The usual attitude is one of apology for the people, and of hope that in time they will do better. Prof. W. F. Dodd, however, of the University of Illinois, says squarely: "It is not necessary that such a popular judgment be represented by a majority of all persons voting at a general election, or by a majority of all the electors of the State. Indeed, such requirements are practically prohibitive, because of the fact already referred to that a larger vote can ordinarily be gotten for candidates than for measures." Voting under representative forms, then, is still the "popular" method of government.

Such a philosophy as this simply means that the portion of the people interested in a subject should have the right of legislating upon it. If the mass of voters is indifferent, let it be virtually disfranchised. G. K. Chesterton argues vigorously for the opposite theory, that every vote not cast should be counted in the negative. We are not concerned to answer in that matter here. We wish to note now the complete admission, explicit as well as implicit, that, while parts of the American people have allowed themselves to be led to the initiative and referendum water, broadly speaking, they have not drunk of it. This may prove that it is a very foolish people, but it also proves something else, viz., that, in our experience with both representative and direct government, the results have not been of such a character as to permit the stigmatizing of the one as oligarchical, and the honoring of the other as "popular." Each is an imperfect device, dependent for its working upon imperfect human beings. The Republican platform adopted at Chicago contains a sentence that puts the point pithily: "Indifferent citizenship is an evil from which the law affords no adequate protection, and for which legislation can provide no remedy."

A TIME OF VIOLENT LANGUAGE.

Of the heathen it was said anciently that they thought they should be heard for their much speaking. But the modern man appears to think that he shall be heard for his much shrieking. Violent language seems to be on the increase the world over. Dr. Crothers has an amusing and instructive article in the October *Atlantic* on the universal tendency at present towards vehement speech and ferocious attitudes on the part especially of public men. He was in England when the bitter controversy over the Republican nomination for the Presidency was going on in this country. Certain bits of personal vituperation were cabled to the London newspapers, whereupon one of them remarked that "all this is characteristically American, but it shocks the unaccustomed ears of Europe." This moved Dr. Crothers, as a puzzled American abroad, to jot down a few of the things which the ears of Europe were getting from men in European public life. In the House of Commons itself the members were called "miscreants," and the Prime Minister was covered with personal vilification. At Budapest the commonest parliamentary expressions were "swine," "thief," "liar," "assassin." What the Unionists said of Lloyd George, and what he said of them, measured up to the highest American standard. If the ears of Europe have not been accustomed to such verbal assaults, they are rapidly getting to be.

Dr. Crothers has his own theory of the causes of this sudden rush of the democracies of our day into linguistic riot. Vast and impatient bodies of men discover, either that—as they believe—their rights are being taken from them, or that something which they intensely desire is denied them, and by a common impulse they take to shouting and throwing stones and making violent threats. But whatever the explanation, there can be no doubt of the fact. Political argument has come very often to have a shrill and abusive note. Speeches are expected to rise in a violent *crescendo*. Interviews and statements are couched in the most savage words. Writing is thought to be feeble unless it splits its cheeks and tears the language to tatters. A typical instance is the first of Tom Lawson's new articles, which is one long blowing off of epithets and unintelligible invective.

Only by such frantic hurling about of adjectives is it thought that a controversialist can establish a reputation for being truly forcible, or induce people to listen to him.

This is quite explicable, and not all of it is to be condemned. As a sign that men feel strongly about public questions, it is to be welcomed. Indignation and hot convictions are not bad things in politics. Only, it is important that they be well founded, that the fury be directed against real political sins and the right political sinners, and that roused citizens do not content themselves with "slaying Kruger with their mouths." And it is equally desirable that people in a democracy should not forget that there are other ways than vehement oratory and loud outcries to produce a deep impression. Of this we have had a noteworthy instance in the present campaign. It has been remarkable for din and vociferation. But one day a man of detached position and long-established reputation addressed himself to the public. He analyzed the political struggle now going on and gave his opinion of the protagonists in it. He did this in a spirit that was entirely calm and in language that was strong without rage. Not one heated expression escaped him. From his pen there dropped not a single oburgatory word. Yet the opinion was general that this contribution of ex-President Eliot's to our great political debate was more effective than that of any other man.

We are not objecting to vehemence as such. It is sometimes necessary, and it may frequently be useful. But there is danger of its becoming monotonous. Not every man who seeks to get a hearing from the public should think it needful to adopt the 'Erebus vein. The constant strain of noise gets to be tiresome. There are other ways of obtaining attention. By very force of contrast to the strident methods in which we have been over-indulging, a quieter tone would have an excellent chance of attracting notice. Our political speakers and writers would do well to try the effect of a little variety. They might profit by reading Emerson's essay on "The Superlative." Restraint is often more forcible than raging; under-statement than exaggeration. We believe that the excess of violence from which we have been suffering this year is but a passing phase of our political temperament. It seems popular now, but is bound to

wear out; for, like opium, its use compels a constant increasing of the dose, thus defeating its own end.

PSYCHOLOGY OF ELECTION ODDS.

Although betting on election results has seen its best days, there is still enough of it left to make statements of prevailing odds of interest to those on the lookout for "straws"; and these straws are much more to be relied on for a knowledge of the way the wind blows than are the straw votes, little or big, with which individuals and newspapers amuse themselves. Whenever the prevailing odds are decidedly and steadily in favor of a given candidate, the opinion they reflect is almost always verified by the result of the election. In the present campaign, the odds have been steadily quoted at about 2 to 1 on Wilson against the field; and, in the light of past experience, it will be extremely surprising if the man picked out in the betting as so emphatically the favorite should prove to be a loser.

But while the mere selection of the winner—in a case where the battle is not a close one—is executed with a high degree of trustworthiness by the higgling of the bettors, the like can by no means be said as to the arithmetical measure of his chances. Indeed, from the very fact that whenever the standard odds in favor of a candidate are at all heavy the choice is vindicated in the outcome, it may be inferred that these odds are, generally speaking, not heavy enough. If it hardly ever happens that a candidate on whom the odds are 2 to 1 is defeated, it follows that in most cases these odds, to reflect the actual situation, ought to have been much heavier. If, for example, it could be established that out of every ten instances in which these odds prevailed the favored candidate was successful in all but one instance, this would be a sufficient inductive proof that when the betting odds are 2 to 1, the candidate's actual chance of winning is such that the just odds should be 9 to 1. Whatever the reason, the fact seems evident: bettors who feel almost certain that a given candidate will win are either unwilling to offer, or do not find it necessary to offer, odds anything like as high as those which that conviction would justify.

A not uninteresting confirmation of this general view is furnished by the

juxtaposition of the rates said to obtain during the present campaign as affecting the three Presidential candidates, Wilson, Taft, and Roosevelt. It is stated that the odds on Wilson have been, all along, 2 to 1; that on Taft the betting stood first at 1 to 4 and afterwards became 1 to 3; and that on Roosevelt the odds were 1 to 3 and later 1 to 4. We have, then, for the three possibilities (ignoring, as the bettors doubtless do, the off chance of Col. Harvey's imagined deadlock) odds of 2 to 1, 1 to 3, and 1 to 4. Now, assuming that Wilson's chances are correctly measured by odds of 2 to 1, the odds against Roosevelt and the odds against Taft are necessarily too low. This is a simple arithmetical fact. For the odds of 2 to 1 mean that the probability of Wilson being defeated is one-third, and hence that, if Taft's and Roosevelt's chances were equal, each of them would have a chance of one-sixth of being elected. That is, the odds on either Taft or Roosevelt, if alike, ought to be 1 to 5; and if either fared better than this, the other should fare worse. Instead of this, the odds are 1 to 3 and 1 to 4; showing that even the degree of confidence reflected in the Wilson odds fails to get registered where a higher numerical preponderance is required to embody it. The Wilson figures doubtless lag behind the reality of the situation; and the Taft and Roosevelt figures lag behind even those.

To explain the general phenomenon of which we are speaking might form an interesting study in psychology. But it must be remembered that election odds do not register the attitude of the participants towards a known or agreed state of facts, such as belongs to an ordinary game of chance; nor can they properly be regarded as a mean between different estimates of the mathematical probabilities. They are the result of a bargaining process, like the play of demand and supply in the market. There are many men of many minds; some regard the favored result as almost certain, others as somewhat doubtful, while still others feel that there is a reasonable chance of the opposite result. If, for the sake of simplicity, we exaggerate this condition of things, and imagine bettors divided simply into two classes, those who feel sure that A will win and those who feel that there is a very fair chance of his losing, then, if

the former class are decidedly more numerous than the latter, the odds will be heavily in favor of A; but the figure at which they will stand will depend simply on the relative strength of these two bodies, and there is not the slightest reason why it should correspond to the actual probabilities of the case, as they would be viewed, say, by an extremely well-informed and impartial observer. Thus the fact that the odds in A's favor are 2 to 1 expresses, not anybody's deliberate estimate of the mathematical chances of the election, but the undeniable fact that among those engaged in betting there is a heavy preponderance of opinion that A will be elected. And, viewed in this light, the actual experience of campaigns seems just what it should be; for it is not surprising that when the dominant opinion among so large a number of shrewd observers points emphatically and steadily to one result, that opinion is almost sure to be correct.

REWARDS OF LITERATURE.

There is one very considerable portion of the British people for whom the question of minimum-wage legislation must possess peculiar interest. The condition of the large body of men and women who are engaged in the production of novels that do not sell very well, if the subject were only brought up in Parliament, would stir public sympathy quite as powerfully as the case of the coal miners or the railway workers has done. What Parliament would be facing is not a problem but a mystery. The question how a mine worker can live and bring up a family on his meagre wages is a problem. The question how a minor novelist lives is a mystery. One minor novelist has just recounted his experiences in the *National Review*. It is a brief, matter-of-fact record of thirteen years' hard labor at the writing game, involving an output of fourteen published novels, three unpublished novels, and a volume of sketches, and showing a gross profit of £646, or a little less than two hundred and fifty dollars a year. This author now announces his intention of giving up literature and setting up as driver of a taxi-cab; a position, it may be remarked, for which he should be eminently qualified. Any man who has been able to steer his way through life for thirteen years on five dollars a week should find no difficulty

in threading a taxicab through the most congested traffic in Piccadilly. It is true that in some quarters this confession by the writer in the *National Review* has been characterized as unduly pessimistic. Another minor novelist has written a reply in which he shows that in the last nine years he has written eight novels and made an average profit of a thousand dollars a book, thus lifting himself by strenuous effort to the economic level of a motorman or an assistant bookkeeper.

Patriotic Americans will note with pride a striking difference between this country and England in the matter of literary "confessions." In England the magazines print the confessions of novelists who do not sell. In this country the magazines print the confessions of best-sellers. The difference cannot be explained simply on the ground of differences in national temperament. It may be that as a people we know how to take our medicine better than the Englishmen do. If an American writer's books refuse to sell, he either drops out of the "game," or else sticks to the game without making a fuss about it. Our characteristic optimism induces us to lay emphasis on the men who have "arrived." Nevertheless, the preponderance of cheerful confessions over the other kind must be accepted as proving that the rewards of authorship in this country are much higher than abroad and are much more generally diffused. But the interesting question is, Just how much better paid are our novelists than their fellow-craftsmen abroad, and does even our higher average of pay supply the members of the profession as a whole with a living wage? A careful study of several recent human documents in this field leads one to the conclusion that, even in this country which proudly counts a dozen men who ask a thousand dollars for a short story, and which produces every season a half-dozen novels that sell by the hundreds of thousands, the fiction business hardly pays.

We mean that it hardly pays when you consider the mental, physical, and moral effort that goes towards the attainment of success. There are instances, of course, where writers have succeeded in hitting the bull's eye with a first or a second book. But from the published confessions as a whole it is plain that, to the average "best-seller,"

success comes only after years of hard work, discouragement, and, what is most important of all, disenchantment. And here our native writers are at one with the Englishmen. The American producer of best-sellers is at pains to show that he has no illusions with regard to his work. Commercial success is the only thing he claims to have achieved. He did nourish artistic ideals in those far-off days when the high price of beef was a much less vexing problem to him than the high cost of postage stamps. To-day he is engaged in giving the public what it wants. Now and then a novelist will venture to argue that writing the kind of literature the public wants is not a very degrading occupation, after all, but even this writer will seldom pretend that he enjoys doing it. So we still face the question why men will go on writing books which they do not regard as worth while, when the same amount of labor, persistence, and brains would be sure to bring them much higher rewards in any other line of business. Suppose there are a dozen writers in this country to-day who get a thousand dollars for a short story, and earn twenty-five thousand dollars a year. What other profession or calling is there whose twelve most successful practitioners, in a nation of one hundred millions, must be content with so modest an income?

The only profession that is worse paid than literature is the ministry. The number of clergymen in the United States who receive even half of twenty-five thousand dollars may be counted upon the fingers of one hand. But then the minister does enjoy those non-monetary compensations which the writer of best-sellers expressly has sacrificed. Joy in creative effort, joy in one's mission, the good opinion of one's fellow-workers—all these, according to our printed confessions, the successful novelist has thrown overboard. The writer in the *National Review* defines a minor novelist as one whose books average a sale of two thousand copies. If these two thousand copies were "The Egoist" or "What Maisie Knew," the problem would be a simple one. But our writer tells us that he was not engaged in turning out masterpieces, but pot-boilers; and what is the use of writing pot-boilers that do not even serve to make the pot boil? The case of our own best-sellers is essentially the same. It is true they

do keep the pot boiling, with something over for dessert, and even an occasional motor car and a house in the country. Only, the motor cars and the bungalows could be more easily and more plentifully earned if our writers gave up literature for business. There at least one finds the opportunity for doing honest work. Business men do not work with their tongue in their cheek, in order to make a handsome income. They do not have to say to themselves, "I could turn out a very superior brand of soap, but if the public wants bad soap, I give the public what it wants."

THE RETURN OF SIDE-WHISKERS.

It is in France that they keep the closest eye on fashions, and it is from a French source that we learn of the beginnings of a movement in England to restore the side-whisker. So far it is only a tentative and modest effort to return to an earlier style. There is no question as yet of bringing back the long and sweeping hirsute appendages which used to frame the faces of Englishmen in the first years of the last century, falling from the ear far below the chin, as Canning is pictured for us, or as Byron appears in D'Orsay's sketch of him. Not even so far as the "mutton-chop" has any bold innovator yet ventured to go. The first step that costs amounts at present to no more than a slight tuft of hair hardly going below the cheek-bone. But this is now admitted by fashion and soon may be decreed. At the recent marriage of a popular actress in London it was noted that the bridegroom as well as each of his best men wore this faint suggestion of a side-whisker. Note of this was instantly taken by the devotees of the latest style, and the reporters made haste to interview the best-known coiffeur of Mayfair. He solemnly predicted the speedy coming in of the side-whisker, though he added the warning: "It is not sufficient for the man of fashion to have side-whiskers. The essential thing is to know how to wear them."

He, of course, as an expert, was prepared to give advice to young elegants to whom Jove, in his next commodity of hair, might send a beard. He had prepared a series of carefully designed models, some of them in wax, showing the various arrangements of whiskers permissible. Naturally, the comic papers took the matter up. One of them

had the whimsey to print some portraits of modern English statesmen as each of them would appear with the new hairy ornament. Sir Edward Carson might have seemed even more portentous in Ulster if he had worn the truculent whiskers here assigned him, while Winston Churchill, similarly arrayed, could no more be exposed to the taunt—which, for that matter, was flung at Pitt—of Angry Boy.

Most public men in England are careful of their appearance, and their prevailing style has been to go close-shaven. The full beard is, to be sure, tolerated: one could hardly imagine the Duke of Devonshire without it, and the gray wisps at the side of Gladstone's face are familiar. Lloyd George's beligerent moustache is an exception, but it goes well with his reputation for being unconventional if not a trifle revolutionary. The general rule is a hairless face: and it is most often seen in the Englishmen of to-day. One recalls the maxim of Mr. Podsnap: "Rise at eight, close-shave at a quarter past." To many of his fellow-countrymen this has long seemed as indisputably as it did to him a fundamental part of the British Constitution. But with a whisker not so large as a man's hand now on the fashionable horizon, what mad excesses of beard may not be impending!

The fluctuations of custom in this regard have certainly been extraordinary. Women are entitled to turn the laugh on men, in any long view of the styles of wearing a beard, or going without one. The velleities of feminine fashions could show no greater vagaries or more sweeping changes. Go to the library of any college and look at the class-pictures of students graduating between about 1840 and 1855. The faces are clean-shaven. That was then the orthodox American fashion. An old German, who came to this country in those years, has told of his vain looking for work in all the shops and offices up and down Broadway. At last one kind merchant drew him aside and informed him what was the trouble. He wore a heavy moustache. There was no hope of finding employment till he cut that off: it was too defiant of custom, too suspicious. Who could trust a man with hair on his face? But pass on a dozen years to the Civil War period and later, and the land was filled with flamboyant whiskers. Some of the pictures of college baseball teams of that

date, as of the first football elevens—or fiftens—look as if no one were eligible unless he were bearded like the pard. The beard, instead of being a badge of irregularity and something like opprobrium, became a symbol of respectability and even dignity. Everybody knows that Lincoln, when he was elected President felt it necessary to "raise a beard," with a result that was little short of a national misfortune.

There ought to be the largest individual liberty in all this matter. To some faces a beard means salvation; to others a calamity. We have all seen clean-shaven men who appear almost as if making an indecent exposure of their character. There is a story of Gibbon allowing Madame du Deffand, who was blind, to finger his face, but she found his features so repulsive that she instinctively cried out: "Why, this is a bad joke!" A stout hedge of beard would have prevented that; and there are plenty of men whose friends ought to advise them not to stop with the incipient side-whisker of the coming English style, but to cover up as much of their faces as they can.

NEWS FOR BIBLIOPHILES.

That the briefer form of "Diana of the Crossways" was a condensation of the more extended novel for the convenience of serial publication is made virtually certain by the statement of Meredith in one of the letters printed in the September *Scribner's*. In May, 1884 (before the appearance of the first instalment of "Diana"), Meredith writes that he is conducting his heroine on "her sad last way to wedlock," showing that he probably has already got her through the scene that ends the story in the *Fortnightly*. My view is further borne out by the following considerations, of interest also on their own account

It is known that "The Shaving of Shagpat," "Richard Feverel," "Evan Harrington," and "Harry Richmond" were all, in the original form, much longer than as now published. "Shagpat" and "Richard Feverel" did not appear serially. In the other cases, the principal reductions were made from the version common to the periodical and the first edition in book form.* In all these cases, the earliest form is the longest;

*In the final volume of the Memorial Meredith is given an extensive table of alterations "on the original text" of Meredith's novels. But it should be observed that, while no statement is made to that effect, the "original text" is taken to mean, in the case of the prose works, the text of the first edition in book form. This is just the contrary of the method followed with the poems, in which case the original text is stated to mean that of "the first publication of the poems, whether in a periodical or in a volume." As a result of this policy in reference to the prose, there is no statement given of the very great alterations made in some of the novels when published serially—viz., those discussed in the following paragraphs.

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